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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Based upon the evidence presented by the State, the jury could conclude that 
Jesse Elias entered uninvited into the home of a female acquaintance, went up into her 
bedroom and, while she was asleep, penetrated her vagina with his finger. Mr. Elias 
was charged with, and convicted of, penetration by a foreign object1 and burglary. 
Under Idaho Code § 18-6608, penetration by a foreign object can be committed in three 
ways: 1) by the use of force or the threat of force; 2) where the victim is incapable of 
giving lawful consent due to unsoundness of mind; and 3) where the victim is prevented 
from resisting due to an intoxicating, narcotic or anesthetic substance. I.C. § 18-6608. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Elias argued that the State failed to provide sufficient 
evidence that Mr. Elias had penetrated the victim's vagina in any of those three means, 
focusing on the fact that unlike the rape and male rape statutes, and reading these 
statutes in pari materia, the Idaho legislature has omitted from I.C. § 18-6608 any 
language describing the commission of unlawful penetration by a foreign object 
occurring due to the victim being asleep. Compare I.C. § 18-6608 with I.C. § 18-
6101 (6)(a) and with I.C. § 18-6108(7). (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-15.) 
In response, the State does not dispute that there was insufficient evidence to 
support Mr. Elias' conviction under the theory that the victim was unable to give legal 
consent due to unsoundness of mind. (See generally Respondent's Brief.) Instead, the 
State asserts that there was sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Elias used force under 
1 The title of this statue is, "Forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign object." 
1 
either an intrinsic or extrinsic force theory. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-12.) This Reply 
Brief is necessary to address the State's meritless argument. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Elias's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Should this Court vacate Mr. Elias' conviction for unlawful penetration by a foreign 
object because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Elias' Conviction For Unlawful Penetration By A Foreign 
Object Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction 
A. Introduction 
Relying upon the Idaho Court of Appeals' non-final opinion in State v. Jones, 
2011 Opinion No. 57 (September 12, 2011) (Petition for Review pending), the State 
asserts that under either an intrinsic force theory (requiring proof only penetration), or 
an extrinsic force theory (requiring proof of force beyond that inherent in the act of 
penetration), the State provided sufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' conviction on a 
theory that the penetration occurred by the use of force. The State's argument is 
without merit as the plain language of I.C. § 18-6608 requires both penetration and the 
use of force (i.e. extrinsic force), and the State failed to prove that Mr. Elias used any 
more force than was necessary to complete the penetration. 
B. The Plain Language Of The Relevant Portion Of I.C. § 18-6608 Requires Proof 
Of Force More Than That Which Is Necessary To Accomplish Penetration 
Idaho Code § 18-6608 reads as follows: 
Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal 
opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device, against 
the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats 
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of 
execution, or where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of 
mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent, or where 
the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or 
anesthetic substance, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than life. 
I.e. § 18-6608 (emphasis added). The State asserts that the term "against the victim's 
will," is akin to without her consent and further asserts that there is no resistance 
requirement in I.C. § 18-6608. (Respondent's Brief, p.5-7 (citation omitted).) Relying 
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upon Jones, supra., the State reasons that the amount of force necessary to commit 
unlawful penetration by a foreign object, therefore, is the same amount of force 
necessary to commit the crime of battery, which is to say, "intrinsic" force or force 
inherent in the act itself. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) The State concludes, "The 
circumstances surrounding the penetration demonstrate that the penetration was willful 
and accomplished without S.L.C.'s consent or knowledge; therefore, it was 
accomplished by use of force." (Respondent's Brief, p.8 (citation omitted). 
However, in interpreting a statute, this Court begins with the literal words used in 
the statute and construes the pertinent provisions of the statute as a whole. Bradbury v. 
Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009). This Court will not interpret a statute 
in such a way as to render any of its terms mere surplusage, but rather will construe the 
statute in such a manner as to give effect to every word and clause. Id.; State v. 
Marlinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803 (Ct. App. 1995). In relevant part and by its plain 
language, the statute requires the State to prove, among other facts, that the defendant 
caused the penetration, against the victim's will, by the use of force or violence or by 
duress. I.C. § 18-6608. The statute requires proof that the penetration occurred 
against the victim's will, not merely without the victim's consent or knowledge. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.5-7.) The quantum of force must be of a particular nature - it 
must be that which overcomes a victim's will. 
In addition, the use of force or violence is a separate element from the element of 
penetration. To read the statute in the manner suggested by the State would render the 
separate and additional requirement of the use of force or violence under I.C. § 18-6608 
a nullity and mere surplusage, given that the statute already requires proof of 
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penetration in order to sustain a conviction for penetration by a foreign object in any 
form. Taken together, and reading the statute as a whole, it is apparent that the 
quantum of force required to sustain a conviction for forcible penetration by a foreign 
object must be in some appreciable degree greater than that which is merely inherent 
in, or incidental to, the act of penetration. To find otherwise would render the express 
provisions of I.C. § 18-6608 that require force that overcomes the victim's will - in 
addition to the pre-existing requirement of penetration - a nullity. The State's argument 
that I.C. § 18-6608 requires proof of only "intrinsic" force is without merit. "Extrinsic" 
force must be proven, in addition to penetration. 
C. The State Failed To Prove The Amount Of Force Used Was Greater Than That 
Necessary To Commit The Act Of Penetration 
The State alternatively argues that the State presented sufficient evidence under 
an "extrinsic" force theory based upon four facts: 1) Mr. Elias was trespassing; 2) the 
victim described the penetration as painful; 3) a medical examination revealed an 
abrasion inside the victim's vagina; and 4) the victim would have had her legs closed 
when Mr. Elias penetrated her. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) These factors do not support 
a finding that Mr. Elias used any more force than was necessary to accomplish the 
penetration. 
First, the fact that Mr. Elias was trespassing does not factor at all into the amount 
of force necessary to accomplish the penetration. Second, the facts that the victim felt 
pain and an injury occurred do not suggest that the amount of force used was greater 
than that amount of force used in the penetration itself. In essence, the State is arguing 
that the effect, proves the cause. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion 
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suggests that such injury and pain could not occur in similar circumstances where a 
woman was cognizant of, and amenable to, digital penetration of her vagina, and there 
is simply nothing to 'support such a finding. Finally, even if the jury believed that the 
victim's legs were closed, this does not show that Mr. Elias had to use an amount of 
force greater than necessary to accomplish digital penetration. The victim testified that 
she was lying on her back, wearing a big T-shirt and nothing else, and that she rolled 
over onto her right side when she felt the pain associated with the penetration. 
(Tr. Trial, p.41, L.6 - p.42, L.12.) Even assuming that the victim's legs were closed 
when the penetration occurred, the evidence presented demonstrates that Mr. Elias 
used no more force than was necessary to accomplish the penetration. The State's 
argument is without merit. 
There is, without question, a problem with Idaho Code § 18-6608, in that it does 
not criminalize the behavior that the jury found Mr. Elias had engaged in. However, it is 
the legislature's duty to define what constitutes criminal conduct. See Verska v. St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011) (noting that the 
power to correct a socially or otherwise unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not 
the judiciary). Neither the executive branch nor this Court has the power to make 
morally reprehensible conduct criminal. This Court should reject the State's argument 
and find that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' 
conviction in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Elias respectfully requests that this Court vacate his penetration by a foreign 
object conviction and the resulting sentence imposed. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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